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Abstract 
Biodiversity offsetting (BDO) is presented as capable of mitigating development-related harm to 
populations of species while simultaneously enhancing economic development. The technique 
involves constructing such harm as a result of market failures, which can be resolved through market 
solutions. BDO is contentious, attracting outspoken proponents and opponents in equal measure. We 
examine competing perspectives of interested non-governmental actors through a structured discourse 
analysis, using qualitative data coding, of 24 written evidence submissions to the UK Parliament’s 
Environmental Audit Committee’s 2013 Inquiry into Biodiversity Offsetting in England. Nuanced 
positions and areas of agreement notwithstanding, we find that there is a discernible oppositional 
pattern producing core polarities between organisations favouring and resisting BDO. In interpreting 
these oppositional dynamics we observe that it is unlikely that this impasse can be resolved since 
although the debate is framed in terms of differences of view regarding the effectiveness or 
desirability of specific technical aspects of BDO policy, these differences arise from fundamentally 
divergent value framings. Struggles over offsetting involve irresolvable value struggles, and 
negotiations over the assumed (ir)rationality of biodiversity offsetting are thus located firmly within 
political and ideological arenas.  
 
Keywords  
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Highlights 
Discourse analysis of consultation responses on biodiversity offsetting policy in England. 
Analysis reveals strongly polarised views on market-based conservation technologies. 
Differences may be irreconcilable, due to divergent and competing value frames. 
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Nature will not suffer herself to be taken by Nets spun out of the Brain. (James Keill, 
1738) 
 
 
1.1 Introducing Biodiversity Offsetting1  
Biodiversity offsetting (BDO2) is proposed as a mitigation technique for managing development-
related harm to habitats and associated populations. It requires investment in conservation in one or 
more locations, distinct from the development site, in such a way as to measurably produce ‘no let 
loss’, or even a net gain, of biodiversity in a wider area, and over a specified period of time stretching 
into the future (BBOP 2009: 3; also see ten Kate 2003; ten Kate et al. 2004, 9-10; BBOP 2012).  
 
BDO involves (1) the use of standardised calculative frameworks for quantifying harm to populations 
of species caused by changes in infrastructure and industrial developments, and (2) the exchanging or 
trading of this calculated harm through payment for an equivalent or higher calculated increase in 
biodiversity value (an ‘offset’) in a different location and over a specified time period. This strategy is 
claimed to facilitate multiple-win environment and development scenarios. ‘Biodiversity’ is seen to be 
vested with new economic values that both honour its increasing scarcity due to human impacts and 
valorise sites of its conservation and flourishing, making it more likely that such sites will be sustained 
and enhanced. Economic development is boosted both by creating a new technique whereby 
development-related harm can be more easily compensated for, and by constructing biodiversity 
conservation itself as a commodity that might be traded in entrepreneurial markets. ‘Offsets,’ 
including biodiversity offsets, are presented as an extension of the mitigation hierarchy deployed for 
some decades in Environmental Impact Assessment (cf. Carroll and Turpin 2009). They are 
increasingly significant as a ‘last resort’ mitigation tool due to their apparent ability to compensate for 
residual biodiversity losses arising from developments considered as ‘unavoidable’. 
 
International collaboration favouring BDO solutions to biodiversity loss has been fostered by the 
Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP) of the market-oriented Forest Trends group, a 
consortium of representatives from companies, financial institutions, governments and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)3. Under the directorship of lawyer and consultant Kerry ten Kate, 
BBOP has developed global principles and standards for biodiversity offsets, supported by an array of 
technical papers and guidelines.4 By calculating apparent commensurability and substitutability 
between units of species, sites and habitats under inalienable property designations, such technical 
guidelines create and support the possibility of trade in these units between locations chosen for 
‘unavoidable’ harm due to development, and locations chosen for investment in conservation.  
 
A growing number of states are drawing up national policies for the enabling and regulation of BDO, 
accompanied by nascent regional policy such as the European Union’s No Net Loss initiative5. This 
combination of emergent national and regional policy frameworks with the participation, via BBOP, 
of multinational corporate and financial institutions in BDO guidelines and design, is placing BDO 
centre stage as a conservation technology with the potential to stimulate ‘green growth’ on a global 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented by Sian Sullivan as ‘Value struggles in the construction of 
biodiversity offsetting in England’ at a December 2013 Leverhulme Centre for the Study of Value research 
workshop, University of Manchester (www.studyofvalue.org). 
2 Abbreviations used in the text: AONB – Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty; BDO – Biodiversity Offsetting; 
CBD – Convention on Biological Diversity; DCLG – Department for Communities and Local Government; 
DEFRA – UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; EAC – UK Parliamentary Environmental 
Audit Committee; EMTF – Ecosystem Markets Task Force; IUCN – International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature; LPAs – Local Planning Authorities; MBIs – Market-Based Instruments; NNL – No Net Loss; NPPF – 
National Planning Policy Framework; SSSIs – Sites of Special Scientific Interest; UK BAP – United Kingdom 
Biodiversity Action Plan; UN CBD – United Nations Convention on Biodiversity. Table 1 lists the abbreviations 
used for organisations on whose written evidence submissions to the EAC our analysis is based. 
3 http://bbop.forest-trends.org/  
4 For the full range of BBOP resources see: http://bbop.forest-trends.org/pages/guidelines  
5 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/nnl/index_en.htm  
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scale.  
 
1.2 BDO Policy in England 
Together with the United States, Australia, South Africa and Germany, England is considered to be at 
the forefront of developing BDO as a market-based ecological compensation policy (cf. Koh et al., 
2014).6 In the UK, biodiversity offsetting has been unambiguously endorsed at Ministerial level: 
 
Our economy cannot afford planning processes that deal with biodiversity expensively 
and inefficiently or block the housing and infrastructure our economy needs to grow. Our 
environment cannot afford the wrong type of development which eats away at nature. 
[…] Fortunately, as the Ecosystems Market Task Force and Natural Capital Committee 
have set out, there is a way we can make our planning system even better for the 
environment and developers: biodiversity offsetting. (Ministerial Foreword, DEFRA 
Biodiversity Offsetting in England Green Paper, 2013) 
 
Several key policy documents and reports paved the way for this 2013 DEFRA Green Paper. The 2010 
Lawton Report Making Space for Nature suggested that BDO might become a source of new private 
sector funding for a much-needed consolidation and extension of currently under-funded conservation 
estate (Lawton, 2010: 86). Building on these recommendations, DEFRA’s 2011 Natural Environment 
White Paper affirmed (at para 2.40) that ‘biodiversity offsetting should be pursued in line with guiding 
principles, based on those set out in Making Space for Nature’, and signalled the government’s 
intention to set up pilot schemes as a first step towards a national policy. The 2012 National Planning 
Policy Framework (NPPF), while acknowledging that compensation remained a last resort under the 
mitigation hierarchy, nonetheless included new wording giving a clear signal to local authority 
planners that offsite compensation could potentially be used to legitimise development whose 
biodiversity impacts would otherwise have rendered it impermissible: 
 
if significant harm resulting from a development cannot be avoided (through locating on 
an alternative site with less harmful impacts), adequately mitigated, or, as a last resort, 
compensated for, then planning permission should be refused. (DCLG 2012 para. 118) 
 
DEFRA duly set up pilot schemes, involving six local planning authorities and various private sector 
actors and running for two years from April 2012 to April 2014 (DEFRA 2012a; for discussion see 
e.g. Carver in press). At the time of writing the results are being assessed by a consultancy 
(Collingwood Environmental Planning), whose report will inform subsequent legislative moves 
towards a national policy. This policy is being developed alongside, and at times in tension with, a 
range of existing statutory guidelines, frameworks and policies for the multiscalar protection of 
species, habitats and landscapes. These include listings of scarce and protected species, from IUCN’s 
Red Lists of Threatened Species7 to Natural England’s Biodiversity Action Plan8 and its local 
counterparts; obligations to conserve and enhance the natural beauty of the landscape (as set out in 
s.85 of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, and assisted by the IUCN’s inclusion of AONBs 
as Category V Protected Landscapes); the UK’s Post-2010 Biodiversity Framework as required by the 
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity; the business-led Ecosystem Markets Task Force 
(EMTF) (Duke et al. 2012) report commissioned by government, which promotes BDO as a major 
economic opportunity; the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 1990, which gives a legal definition 
of ‘significant harm’9; and the 1992 European Commission Habitats Directive10, which sets out 
requirements for provision of compensatory habitat.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See https://www.gov.uk/biodiversity-offsetting . Biodiversity conservation policy in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland is handled by the devolved administrations. Voluntary biodiversity offsetting is also increasing 
internationally, particularly by extractive industries (see review by Benabou, 2014).  
7 http://www.iucnredlist.org/  
8 http://www.naturalengland.org.uk/ourwork/conservation/biodiversity/protectandmanage/prioritylist.aspx  
9 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/43/contents    
10 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31992L0043:EN:HTML  
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1.3 A potent moment  
BDO in England is attracting outspoken proponents and opponents in equal measure, from a wide 
spectrum of interest groups. Several recent events illustrate the liveliness of the debate. Between 
September and November 2013 DEFRA held a public consultation on its proposed policy, structured 
around 38 specific questions relating to its BDO Green Paper (DEFRA, 2013). Workshops were held 
in various locations as part of this consultation (we participated in one held in London on 27th October 
2013), and on 22nd October the Royal Society hosted a policy discussion entitled ‘Biodiversity 
Offsetting: can it work in England?’ (which we also attended). Simultaneously, the UK Parliament’s 
Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) conducted its own Inquiry into Biodiversity Offsetting in 
England11, following extensive questioning of the Head of the UK’s Natural Capital Committee, Prof. 
Dieter Helm, on BDO in the context of an earlier Inquiry into Well-being12. We contributed 
submissions to both the DEFRA and EAC consultations, as academics with a research interest in 
BDO.  
 
Alongside these interventions, October 2013 also saw publication of a strongly worded statement 
asserting ‘No to Biodiversity Offsetting’13, issued by a range of European social movements and 
grass-roots organisations. This followed a workshop in Brussels (in which we participated) on 
‘Ecosystems Offsetting and Trading’, and argued that BDO is ‘a false solution’ to environmental 
damage, which will in reality weaken environmental protection and facilitate greater global 
degradation of ecosystems and communities that are already under threat. The debate continued into 
2014 with the global conference ‘To No Net Loss of Biodiversity and Beyond’, organised in London 
by BBOP for BDO practitioners and policy-makers, tickets for which sold out within two weeks.14 
This June event was accompanied by a counter-forum of academics and activists contesting the 
legitimacy of offsetting on both ecological and social grounds.15 We both attended the latter event, and 
one of us (Sullivan) attended the No Net Loss conference. 
 
This, then, is a potent moment in the emergence of formal BDO policy both internationally and in the 
UK. England is being watched closely by varied interest groups in Europe and beyond, due to its well-
advanced formulation of BDO policy as well as DEFRA’s development of a standardised BDO metric 
as a key, if controversial, calculative device (cf. Callon and Muneisa, 2005) on which BDO exchanges 
might be based (DEFRA 2012b; see discussion in Hannis and Sullivan 2012; Knights et al. 2013; 
Sullivan 2013).  
 
Textual material in the public domain, in the form of responses to the public consultations detailed 
above, provides an important source of qualitative data that can be analysed systematically in order to 
identify key value statements and assumptions animating debate. ‘Value statements’ here refers to 
utterances expressing clear positive or negative attitudes towards elements of BDO proposals, and/or 
towards views and actions of other actors and organisations. In this paper we seek to identify the 
different and competing value frames (cf. Lakoff 2010) underlying the value statements mobilised by 
non-governmental actors engaging with BDO policy-making. We do this through a structured 
discourse analysis (cf. Johnstone 2008) of 24 written submissions to the EAC Inquiry.  
 
We proceed by describing our methodological approach (section 2), followed by a summary of the key 
discursive patterns identified for the texts thus analysed, focusing on apparent areas of agreement and 
disagreement in these texts (section 3). Our discussion notes the intractable nature of several clear 
polarities in the views expressed. We suggest that deliberative processes such as the EAC Inquiry and 
the DEFRA consultation into BDO, whilst promising in terms of enhancing debate, dialogue and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See launch notice at http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/environmental-audit-committee/news/biodiversity-offsetting-launch/  
12 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/environmental-audit-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/well-being/  
13 http://no-biodiversity-offsets.makenoise.org/       
14 http://bbop.forest-trends.org/events/no-net-loss/  
15 http://naturenotforsale.org/  
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deliberation in service to the emergence of new modes of environmental governance (cf. Bäckstrand et 
al., 2010), may also leave irresolvable impasses in their wake. Such antagonisms arise from divergent 
values and ontologies (cf. Descola, 2013; Sullivan 2013): proposed by Boltanksi and Thévenot (2006) 
as orders or economies of worth that give rise to incommensurable principles of collective agreement 
and create discord when one set of principles or ‘rules of law’ is insisted to be universal16. Divergent 
values, ontologies and orders of worth mean that ‘difference makes a difference’ (paraphrased from 
Bateson 1972, also Chakrabarty 2007: xii; Kohn 2013). This may be particularly so when recognition 
of divergences is precluded by the terms and frames within which deliberation is set (Martin et al., 
2013), when people do not share the same principles that determine equivalence of worth (Boltanksi 
and Thévenot, 2006: 33), and when technical proposals and procedures are incorrectly assumed to be 
devoid of normative principles (ibid.: 29). All of these are, of course, also associated with the vested 
economic interests of actors operating within an unequally accessed capitalist market economy. This 
means that BDO is also struggled over as a market-based instrument with the potential to add 
economic value to owned land, to create new economic values of units of nature for those able to 
assert ownership over these units, and to speed up development decisions.  
 
Thus, although a deliberative process such as the EAC Inquiry may focus on differences of view 
regarding the effectiveness or desirability of specific proposed policies and techniques, polarities also 
arise from, and reveal, underlying ideological differences in the value frames or orders of worth held 
by participants in the debate (cf. Lakoff 2010).17 Following de Angelis (2007), then, we suggest that 
struggles over BDO can be seen, at least in part, as irresolvable value struggles: arising from value 
incommensurabilities (cf. O’Neill, 1997) associated with different views of what behaviours constitute 
desirable human relationships with nonhuman nature and, in particular, over whether or not it is 
sensible to assume that conservation outcomes will arise from entraining nonhuman nature even more 
systemically with the ‘law of value’ of capital (de Angelis, 2007; Büscher et al., 2012). These views 
are in turn underscored by different normative conceptions of rationality; as well as by contested 
ontological assumptions regarding the nature of nature, and thus the nature of best practice for nature 
conservation.  
 
 
2. Material and methods 
Our focus is a qualitative textual and discourse analysis of 24 publicly available18 written submissions 
to the UK Parliament Environmental Audit Committee’s 2013 Inquiry into Biodiversity Offsetting in 
England. The Inquiry was launched on 1st October 2013, and open for submissions until 15th October, 
overlapping with DEFRA’s Green Paper consultation discussed above. Many submissions are clearly 
influenced by the content of this latter parallel consultation (for example, the Country Land and 
Business Association uses the exact DEFRA consultation questions to structure their written 
evidence), but EAC respondents were not required to address their submissions directly to the Green 
Paper proposals.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Boltanksi and Thevénot (2006) propose a series of orders of worth via which people tend to justify their 
positions and logics in varied situations, whilst Latour (2013) proposes a detailed consideration of the different 
rules of verification deployed and justifying different ‘modes of existence’ in modern institutional domains. Both 
are reminiscent of the concept of ‘regimes of truth’ asserted by Foucault (1991[1975]) as the self-reinforcing 
assemblage of knowledges, techniques and discourses that are inseparable from practices of power as these arise 
in modern institutions. There are traces of all these approaches in our analysis of the justificatory rhetorics and 
logics infusing what we are describing as the ‘value statements’ identified in our analysis. A systematic 
reanalysis deploying the categories proposed by the above authors could be a fruitful avenue for further research, 
but is beyond the scope of the present paper.	   17	  Also see Read and Scott Cato (2014), who in a recently published paper arrive at a similar conclusion for 
debates regarding the construction of nature as ‘natural capital’.	  
18 At http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenvaud/750/75012.htm We have 
excluded our own submission to the EAC from this analysis. It is available for viewing here: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/WrittenEvidence.svc/EvidencePdf/2911 
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The EAC submissions provide a self-selected sample of non-governmental interests and concerns 
relating to BDO policy. They range from responses that strenuously oppose BDO to those celebrating 
it, and as such it is likely that the transcripts are indicative of the spectrum of views present amongst 
organisations and actors in England with interests in this policy. The type of organisation (NGO, 
Union, commercial company, etc.) and stated focus of its work (conservation, trade, commercial 
development, etc.) was used as an initial descriptor to categorise the transcripts (see Table 1), based on 
self-descriptions in the Inquiry transcripts combined with review of organisation websites. This is 
simply to show the range and number of organisations and individuals that submitted transcripts, 
without making any prior judgements as to the type or homogeneity (or otherwise) of views regarding 
BDO held by organisations listed under the same descriptor. Our intention is for these views to emerge 
from the analysis of the transcripts (see Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3), such that our reflections and 
interpretations are led by the data rather than overly prescribed in advance. The EAC have published 
their own summary of the written evidence submissions.19  
 
We deployed the online software coding programme Dedoose (2013) so as to offer a structured 
analysis of these qualitative data through uploading the written evidence texts as transcripts and 
subjecting them to a systematic comparative coding process carried out by one of us (Sullivan). As 
with other qualitative data analysis software such as NVIVO or MAXQDA, the coding of transcript 
excerpts through Dedoose encourages very close reading and categorisation of texts, whilst permitting 
comparative analysis and the assessment of patterns through the software’s options for exporting 
coded excerpts, creating charts and other data summaries. Codes were applied primarily to excerpts 
that asserted positive or negative opinions or ‘value statements’ regarding aspects of BDO. A total of 
823 excerpts were thus created and coded. For the first part of our analysis (section 3.2) we focus on 
34 codes that were linked to excerpts from at least five transcripts. These then illustrate areas of 
agreement in the transcripts20 and thus highlight overlaps and patterns in the dataset. In section 3.3 we 
identify a range of polarised views that were clearly presented in the transcripts, as illustrated by 
specific statements that demonstrate the oppositional dynamics also present in the dataset. Coded 
excerpts referred to below are identified using the name (or abbreviated name, see Table 1) of the 
organisation to which the transcript is attributed, combined with the excerpt number generated by 
Dedoose (e.g. FoE [i.e. Friends of the Earth] #5). 
 
Although requiring reader selectivity and interpretation at every step of the coding process, an 
advantage of submitting texts to such structured and systematic reading is that this permits a relatively 
distanced assessment of key patterns and discursive structuring, as indicated by the numerical 
prevalence of codes used to describe views stated by the authors of the texts (cf. Svarstad et al. 2008). 
Coded transcripts are available for viewing by request to the authors. Our analysis is also informed by 
observant participation in relevant meetings and events, as detailed above.     
 
 
3. Results 
As can be seen from Table 1, the largest group of organisations to submit written evidence were 
‘conservation charities’, i.e. non-governmental and non-profit organisations whose stated aim is some 
specified aspect of ‘nature conservation’ and/or environmental education, although their ways of 
working towards this, including their embrace or otherwise of MBIs, may be divergent. Only one 
commercial company submitted evidence (the building materials and construction company Lafarge 
Tarmac), although the views of commercial developers and other landowners are also represented by a 
cluster of trade, industry and landowners associations. The professional bodies CIWEM and IEMA 
and the private sector offsets broker The Environment Bank all have professional and business interest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Available at http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/WrittenEvidence.svc/EvidencePdf/2911 On the basis of 
the EAC’s post-Inquiry recommendations, the government withdrew a prior proposal to draw up a national 
policy prior to the completion of the pilot study. 20	  Note that by ‘areas of agreement’ we are referring to overlapping views in the transcripts, some of which may 
be in disagreement with proposed BDO policy, rather than areas of agreement with BDO policy.	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in BDO. NERC and environmental law professor Colin Reid can be considered to represent views that 
are relatively independent of direct participation in any emergent BDO markets.  
 
 
Table 1. Written evidence submissions to the UK Parliament’s Environmental Audit Committee 
Inquiry, October 2013, by descriptor for organisation. 
 
Description of 
organisation 
Name of organisation  Abbreviated 
name 
Number of 
excerpts 
coded  
Length 
(characters) 
Developer / 
commercial company 
Lafarge Tarmac LT 23 7,111 
Trade associations / 
alliances / unions 
Aldersgate Group AG 22 6,905 
Country Land and Business 
Association  
CLBA 45 31,908 
Home Builders Federation HBA 17 7,546 
Mineral Products 
Association 
MPA 25 17,316 
National Farmers Union NFU 22 15,762 
RenewableUK RUK 17 10,735 
Conservation / 
environmental 
charities and volunteer 
groups 
The Amphibian and Reptile 
Conservation Trust 
ARCT 56 29,006 
Bexley Natural 
Environment Forum 
BNEF 42 22,011 
Buglife BL 38 9,416 
Field Studies Council FSC 11 9,491 
National Trust NT 47 17,923 
Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds  
RSPB 76 38,373 
The Wildlife Trusts TWT 81 39,985 
Woodland Trust WT 21 9,644 
Yorkshire and Humber 
Ecological Data Trust 
YHEDT 8 15,480 
Independent 
government 
organisation 
North Wessex Downs Area 
of Outstanding Natural 
Beauty Partnership 
NWDA 26 11,732 
Environmental 
advocacy NGO 
Friends of the Earth FoE 86 36,107 
Professional bodies Chartered Institute of Water 
and Environmental 
Management  
CIWEM 12 5,698 
Institute of Environmental 
Management and 
Assessment  
IEMA 37 15,558 
Private sector offsets 
Broker 
The Environment Bank EB 75 23,007 
Think tank Policy Exchange PE 26 13,941 
Government research 
council 
Natural Environment 
Research Council 
NERC 7 4,350 
Independent academic Prof. Colin T. Reid CR 3 4,229 
Mike Hannis and Sian 
Sullivan 
Not included in analysis 
 
 
3.1 Key areas of agreement 
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Thirty-four codes were each linked to five or more EAC submissions, and we use these to illustrate 
areas of agreement in views expressed in the transcripts. Table 2 lists key codes for both positive 
views and expressions of concern regarding BDO. Expressions of concern outnumber positive views 
of BDO, although a large number of submissions express a view that BDO could have a part to play in 
biodiversity conservation in England. A range of organisations state that BDO could engender triple-
win outcomes through benefitting biodiversity, economic efficiency and streamlining land-use 
planning. Thus for the private sector offsets brokerage firm the Environment Bank Ltd., BDO will 
serve the ‘triple bottom line’21 interests of people, planet and profit (framed alternatively in economic 
language as human, natural and financial ‘capital’), by delivering an ‘improved planning system, 
improved biodiversity conservation, [and] avoiding additional costs’ to developers (EB #13,39: also 
HBF #9). Concerns regarding BDO are strongly associated with organisations specifically focussed on 
conservation and environmental management. They emphasise possible losses of biodiversity that may 
arise through BDO, the devaluing of local community relationships with local natures that may occur 
due to ‘moving nature elsewhere’, the possibility for creating a mechanism for the ‘tradeable 
destruction of nature’, and concerns regarding inherent uncertainties associated with restoring and 
(re)creating habitats. None of the private sector development organisations in the dataset are linked 
with these latter codes.  
 
 
Table 2. Positive views and key expressions of concern regarding BDO. 
 
Code and number of associated organisations (≥5) Linked organisations (n=24)I  
Please refer to Table 1 for transcript 
descriptor	  
Positive views of BDO: 
Could have a part to play in biodiversity conservation, if well-designed 
and regulated (12) 
AG; CLBA; BNEF; NT; RSBP; TWT; WT; 
NWDA; CIWEM; IEMA; PE; NERC 
Will contribute win-win outcomes, i.e. improving triple bottom-line of 
value for nature, saving money for business and increasing speed in 
planning process (6) 
AG; HBF; NT; RSPB; PE; EB  
Clarifies imperative to assess and quantify development impacts (5) ARCT; NT; RSPB; IEMA; PE 
 
Concerns regarding BDO: 
BDO will cause biodiversity loss through losses in situ that may never 
be retrieved (9) 
BL; BNEF; NT; NWDA; RSPB; WT; FoE; 
CIWEM; IEMA 
Local wildlife sites will not be properly valued due to pressure for 
development (9)  
CLBA; ARCT; BNEF; FSC; NT; NWDA; 
RSPB; FoE; IEMA 
Loss of local value (place) will occur through shifting nature to 
different places (8) 
ARCT; BNEF; FSC; NT; NWDA; FoE; 
CIWEM; IEMA;  
Will generate reduced access to nature / green spaces by local 
communities (8) 
CLBA; ARCT; BNEF; FSC; NT; NWDA; 
RSPB; FoE;  
Will increase separations between nature and people and reduce well-
being, particularly in urban areas (8) 
BNEF; FSC; NT; NWDA; RSPB; WT; FoE; 
CIWEM 
Biodiversity gain will not be delivered (6) ARCT; BNEF; NT; NWDA; FoE; CIWEM 
Incomparability between harm and offset sites will cause additional 
biodiversity decline due to development (5) 
ARCT; BL; NWDA; TWT; NT  
Will cause tradeable destruction of habitat (5) ARCT; BNEF; NWDA; FoE; CIWEM 
Habitats difficult to restore = uncertainty (5) RSPB; NWDA; TWT; FoE; CIWEM 
i For ease of reference these are listed in the order they appear on Table 1. 
 
Notwithstanding these different expressions of the positive and possibly problematic aspects of 
proposed BDO policy, observations that the current planning system needs to be improved were 
shared across the spectrum of respondents. As Table 3 indicates, these concerns coalesce around 
observations of the current lack of ecological, monitoring and enforcement capacity in LPAs, whilst 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 As proposed in 1994 by John Elkington, founder of the consultancy SustainAbility 
http://www.sustainability.com/history  
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affirming the significant role that the planning system has to play in the mitigation of harms to 
biodiversity. 
 
 
Table 3. Expressions of concern regarding the current planning system in England. 
 
Code and number of associated organisations (≥5) Linked organisations (n=24) 
Please refer to Table 1 for transcript 
descriptor 
Lack of capacity, data and expertise in LPAs (8) HBF; MPA; ARCT; BNEF; FSC; NWDA; 
IEMA; PE  
Planning system is not working for nature conservation (7) MPA; BNEF; NWDA; TWT; IEMA; EB; 
PE 
Lack of monitoring of existing mitigation and compensation measures 
(7) 
MPA; ARCT; BNEF; NWDA; FoE; IEMA; 
PE 
Few ecologists in planning system = deficit of skills for assessment and 
verification (7) 
CLBA; MPA; BNEF; FSC; RSPB; TWT; 
PE 
Case for change to existing system is clear and evidenced (6) CLBA; TWT; FoE; IEMA; EB; PE 
The planning process has a significant role to play in mitigating harm to 
biodiversity (6)  
AG; CLBA; HBF; ARCT; NWDA; IEMA 
Planning system needs to be more robust (6) HBF; ARCT; BNEF; NWDA; IEMA 
When mitigation or compensation is currently requested it is rarely 
delivered effectively (5) 
MPA; RSPB; FoE; IEMA; EB 
Slow pace of processing planning applications (5) CLBA; HBF; MPA; RSPB; EB 
Lack of enforcement (5) MPA; ARCT; NWDA; IEMA; PE 
 
Areas of agreement are also noticeable with regard to proposed ‘ground-rules’ for designing and 
applying a BDO policy, should the government move in this direction (see Table 4). Forceful 
assertions were made in most submissions that the mitigation hierarchy should be adhered to with 
BDOs only being approved as a very last resort. Many transcripts also emphasise the need for strong 
regulation, centralised and standardised processes of registration and accreditation, and rigorous 
monitoring and review of granted offsets. Mirroring the observations in Table 3 above, a recurrent 
theme was that this need should be met by LPA expertise and activity, and that despite austerity 
measures LPAs need to be strengthened and better resourced by government so as to deliver the 
ecological and enforcement capacity required for permitting and monitoring offsets such that they 
properly satisfy conservation requirements.    
 
Table 4. BDO policy design ‘ground-rules’  
 
Code and number of associated organisations (≥5) Linked organisations (n=24) 
Please refer to Table 1 for transcript 
descriptor 
Ecological aspects: 
Ecological network / green infrastructure connectivity and 
consolidation should be maximised strategically (10) 
AG; CLBA; BL; BNEF; NWDA; RSPB; TWT; 
YHEDT; IEMA; PE 
BDO must be designed to deliver net gains / additionality for 
wildlife/biodiversity (6) 
AG; MPA; NT; RSPB; TWT; IEMA 
Ecological baselines at sites need to be established as soon as possible 
for monitoring purposes (6) 
RSPB; TWT; WT 
Offset habitat must be distance-near (6) CLBA; BL; NWDA; TWT; WT; CR 
Mature irreplaceable habitats, sites of national importance and SSSIs 
should not be replaced with low quality ‘simplified’ habitat (5) 
NT; RSPB; TWT; WT; CIWEM 
Offset location should be plan-led, i.e. based on appropriate spatial 
plans (5) 
MPA; NWDA; TWT; IEMA 
Socio-ecological aspects: 
Local interactions between people and wildlife need to be sustained, 
e.g. through distance-near offsets (6)  
FSC; NWDA; TWT; WT; CIWEM; CR 
Lost access to wildlife by local communities must also be 
compensated for (5) 
NT; NWDA; TWT; CIWEM; CR 
Institutional structures: 
LPAs need to be supported by government, particularly in ecological HBF; MPA; BNEF; FSC; NWDA; RSPB; 
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and enforcement capacities (10) TWT; WT; YHEDT; PE 
Outcomes need to be independently monitored, mapped and assessed 
for duration of the offset agreement / over the long-term (9) 
AG; ARCT; BNEF; NWDA; RSPB; WT; 
YHEDT; IEMA; PE  
Government must produce clear guidelines and standards on how to 
adhere to every stage of the mitigation hierarchy (8) 
HBF; MPA; FSC; NWDA; RSPB; TWT; 
IEMA; PE; 
There needs to be a formal, independent accreditation system / 
regulator for offset providers, i.e. a central registration database to 
prevent double-selling (7) 
AG; BNEF; NT; NWDA; RSPB; WT; PE  
Needs to be controlled by a strict national regulatory framework (7) AG; CLBA; HBA; MPA; NT; RSPB; WT  
Offset accreditation should be supported by a rigorous, independent 
biodiversity/ecological evidence database based on nationally agreed 
standards (6) 
FSC; NWDA; RSPB; TWT; WT; YHEDT; 
IEMA   
Legal and financial framework needs to be rigorous, transparent and 
consistent (6) 
AG; HBF; MPA; NT; RSPB; TWT;  
A transparent, robust approach is need to ensure net gain / 
additionality (6) 
AG; CBLA; BNEF; NWDA; IEMA; PE;  
Regular, standardised monitoring reports for offsets should provide 
evidence for review by LPAs (5) 
AG; BNEF; NWDA; RSPB; TWT  
Policy design:  
The mitigation hierarchy must be followed and adhered to (17) AG; CLBA; HBF; RUK; ARCT; BL; BNEF; 
NT; NWDA; RSPB; TWT; WT; CIWEM; 
IEMA; EB; PE; NERC; 
Must always be a last resort, i.e. only for unavoidable projects with 
residual loss elements – must not prejudice decision-making (10) 
BL; BNEF; NT; NWDA; RSPB; TWT; WT; 
CIWEM; IEMA; NERC 
Compensation must be sufficiently long lasting (i.e. on ecological 
time-frames) – ‘in perpetuity’ should be an aim (9)   
ARCT; NWDA; RSPB; TWT; WT; CIWEM; 
CR  
Adequate long-term funding for offset sites and restoration needs to be 
assured (6) 
MPA; ARCT; NT; RSPB; TWT; CIWEM 
Funding should meet full-cost recovery needs of offset providers at 
outset of development (5) 
MPA; NFU; ARCT; NT; TWT  
General 
BDO must not become a green-card or short-cut for development (6) BL; NT; NWDA; RSPB; WT; CIWEM 
 
 
DEFRA’s proposed metric, as the key technical and metrological device for calculating harms and 
constructing equivalence with offsets, elicits concerns regarding potential losses that may arise due to 
its perceived shortcomings. These are expressed primarily by conservation and environmental 
organisations, and can be distilled into the two points noted in Table 5. 
  
 
Table 5. Key concerns regarding the proposed DEFRA metric for calculating harm and offset 
values. 
 
Code and number of associated organisations (≥5) Linked organisations (n=24) 
Please refer to Table 1 for transcript 
descriptor 
Cannot reflect complexity of nature/biodiversity/species (10) ARCT; BL; BNEF; NT; NWDA; RSPB; 
TWT; FoE; IEMA; NERC 
No means of valuing social, cultural and historic values in the metric 
(6) 
FSC; NWDA; WT; FoE; CR; NERC 
 
 
Having identified some broad areas of agreement shared between different submissions, we move now 
to highlight polarities in the dataset, which we argue are illustrative of intractable value struggles 
regarding appropriate ways to frame and address contemporary harms to biodiversity.  
 
3.2 Polarities and value frames  
Notwithstanding the broad areas of agreement noted in 3.1 above, strong polarities and oppositional 
dynamics are also noticeable in the submissions. We identify nine of these below, using key excerpts 
from the Inquiry transcripts to illustrate underlying oppositional value frames, which we draw out by 
presenting these oppositions in the form of polar either/or statements.     
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1) Market-based valuation is 
(i) essential for 
 or 
(ii) anathema to, biodiversity conservation. 
A large number of submissions (11) make explicit reference to BDO as a market-based instrument 
(MBI), but normative views regarding whether this would be desirable pull in very different 
directions. The CLBA (#7) ‘see offsetting as being primarily a commercial matter with the landowner 
deciding that he wishes to dedicate his land for conservation purposes so long as the price is right’. 
Thus, as ‘a market based approach to addressing biodiversity loss’ it ‘should better value biodiversity 
loss’, so as to pay providers more than simply ‘income foregone’ (NFU #10), i.e. offset providers 
should profit financially from their participation in the market (ARCT #47). The Home Builders 
Federation (#12) celebrates technical support for the emergence of market liquidity in BDO offset 
products, while the Mineral Products Association (#23) asserts that offset providers will require 
sufficient demand from developers in order to make their participation as an offset-supplier in this new 
market an attractive business proposition. 
 
For others, these same aspects of BDO trigger concern over coupling ‘biodiversity enhancement’ 
(MPA #10) with market demand. Approaching biodiversity conservation by creating a market in 
conservation units that can be traded for profit is seen as an irrational response to current limitations of 
the planning system (FoE #29-35). Those concerned that it is precisely this way of conceiving and 
attributing value that has resulted in biodiversity decline, argue that this strategy will simply add new 
layers in the ‘race to the cheapest’ through which nature currently is devalued. Thus the National Trust 
(#40,45) is concerned that BDO will ‘draw in new commercial players, who lack the expertise or long-
term commitment, but will offer cheap solutions to developers’, and that it will be important that ‘it is 
not necessarily the cheapest option that is pursued, but the most appropriate offset for the environment 
and people’. The BNEF (#29) state that BDO is ‘creating a financial “pull” for destroying sites as well 
as a “push” from development proposals’, and the Amphibian and Reptile Trust (#27) are concerned 
that ‘[m]anaging “supply and demand” against both uncertainties of development and of being able to 
match an ecological need in the right area could start driving perverse incentives’, including ‘loss of 
characteristic species/habitats to be replaced by more easily created habitat types’ (also ARCT #33; 
NWDA#6; TWT #52). 
 
2) The DEFRA metric will 
 (i) rationalise, simplify and improve assessments of relationships between development and 
conservation 
 or  
(ii) cause further biodiversity decline through exacerbating relational distance between humans and 
nature, facilitating the further commodification of nature, and over-simplifying ecological complexity. 
The metric tends to be valorised by developers and landowners on the grounds that its application will 
simplify existing processes (e.g. AG #11; CBLA #12; HBF #13), reduce planning costs, assist with the 
process of finding appropriate sites for future development, enhance transparency, and facilitate the 
emergence of market liquidity in a new BDO market (e.g. HBF #3,4,12,13,15; IEMA #24; EB #45). 
For the Environment Bank, ease of use conferred through enabling devices such as the metric is of 
particular importance, especially for farmers and landowners (#60,76). This is a principle they are 
independently working to foster through development of online tools such as their ‘biodiversity 
calculator’22, which permits an easy indicative calculation of biodiversity units by hectare of 
predefined habitat types, based on the DEFRA metric values for habitat condition and distinctiveness.  
 
Simplification is also the focus of reasons given by environmental and conservation organisations for 
contesting the metric. They argue that the aspiration towards simplicity pulls in the opposite direction 
to the realities of ecological and biodiversity complexity, including the dynamic requirements of 
species, the integrity of which BDO policy is framed as being designed to protect (BL #2; NT #48; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See http://www.environmentbank.com/impact-calculator.php  
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NWDA #12,27; #FoE #55; NERC #5). As such, the equivalences that the metric is designed to 
construct are deemed questionable on both ethical and scientific grounds (CR #1). Alarm is expressed 
in particular over the apparent claim in the Green Paper (at para. 25) that the metric could be 
satisfactorily applied to ascertain habitat ‘value’ in only 20 minutes, with adjectives such as ‘cavalier’ 
and ‘ignorant’ used to describe this intention (BNEF #18). Regarding conservation outcomes, many 
submissions claim that the foundational, even ontological, inability of the metric to incorporate 
ecological and cultural complexity will of necessity lead to a further retrenching of biodiversity 
(BNEF #20). NERC (#5) summarises the tension thus: 
Transferability [of habitat characteristics] will increase as the metric gets more general, but will 
lose ecosystem specificity and potentially value (and accuracy) of the offset. A metric that captures 
community structure and composition makes it less likely [to be able to be applied].  
 
3) Developers are 
(i) only interested in profit, and not genuinely interested in nature 
or  
(ii) effective conservationists of biodiversity. 
A number of submissions suggest suspicion regarding the linkage between development and 
biodiversity conservation, which translates into suspicion regarding developers’ interest in BDO. The 
observation in 3.1 above that few developers or trade associations are linked in the transcripts with 
concerns listed in Table 2 perhaps supports the perception that developer interest in BDO here is less 
to do with biodiversity than it is to do with potential economic gains. On the other hand, developers 
are keen to affirm their roles as conservationists (LT #11,12). The Mineral Products Association 
(MPA #9), representing a membership of 465 companies, thus describes its restored sites as ‘our 
National Nature Park’, stating that: 
The minerals industry has an enviable and unrivalled track record of delivering net gain in 
biodiversity through innovative and imaginative site management and restoration. A recent survey 
of a selection of our members identified that to date it has delivered over 5,000 hectares of priority 
habitat creation on its sites to date, with a further 5,000 hectares yet to be delivered but in 
approved restoration plans.   
 
4) BDO is intended to benefit 
(i) developers 
or 
(ii) biodiversity. 
Several submissions express concern that the biodiversity protection requirements of the current 
planning system are not working for development. The Environment Bank, for example, talks of the 
‘angst amongst planners and developers’ caused by ‘highly protected species’ (EB #65,66). 
Developers are thus ‘constantly frustrated by delays to their planning permission driven by species-
based conservation issues, with millions of pounds lost through extending programme times and 
reduced net developable areas’, ‘[t]he only beneficiaries of [which]… are the environmental 
consultants who service this industry, and the manufacturers of equipment (e.g. newt fencing) to do 
the same’ (EB #23,27,69). They argue that by streamlining the planning process a significant amount 
of developable land could be freed up quickly and cheaply, bringing business opportunities for support 
sectors such as brokers and impact assessors (EB #27,35,76).  
 
Indeed, for Lafarge Tarmac largescale development is actively required for BDOs: ‘for offsetting to be 
a viable option the developments associated with it are largely to be of a larger scale’ (LT #10). Of 
interest here, however, is the company’s stated interest, as ‘one of largest landowners in the country’, 
in becoming an ‘offset provider’ given a situation where BDO may make offset provision into a 
profitable enterprise for landowners (LT #3; also MPA #2). Making offset provision into a profitable 
enterprise means that commercial companies and entrepreneurs, including those enacting 
developments whose harms requires offsets, are increasingly likely to offer conservation by providing 
these offsets, as long as the price is right. Large-scale business interests are thereby constructed as 
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meeting both the development and the conservation needs of society, with both boosting profit (see 
especially LT and MPA submissions).23  
 
Such assertions of the development benefits from BDO generate objections in other submissions, 
clustering around a concern that BDO policy is being designed in ways that support the businesses that 
cause harm to biodiversity, rather than supporting the biodiversity that is thereby harmed. The RSPB 
(#38), for example, states that:  
[w]e welcome the statements in the Green Paper that the mitigation hierarchy is adhered to, but 
this assertion is undermined and contradicted by the explicit desire for offsetting to free up more 
land on site for development (because mitigation will no longer be necessary).  
 
The BNEF (#16) similarly express concerns that BDO will extend a situation where the planning 
system is ‘already heavily biased towards the concrete and tarmac merchants’, whilst the National 
Trust (NT #3) and Buglife (BL #17) respectively worry that BDO may provide a development ‘short 
cut’ or ‘green card’. From a biodiversity and species perspective, as these respondents see it, blocking 
or delaying ecologically damaging development is precisely what the planning system should be 
doing, so to the extent that this is indeed happening the current system can be seen to be working.  
 
5) BDO should 
(i) speed up the planning process for developers 
 or 
(ii) increase the strength and rigour of LPA monitoring, regulation and enforcement.  
As noted in Table 3, there is wide agreement regarding the need for change in the planning system. At 
the same time, there is tension between views that strongly promote a reduction in the bureaucratic 
burden on industry, with a concomitant shift of conservation to the private sector from ‘its current 
charitable and public sector niche’ (EB #57,58), and views that seek a strengthened planning and 
enforcement system, combined with strong national guidelines and accreditation structures. 
Unsurprisingly, developers and associated trade organisations wish to add as little friction to their 
activities as possible. Recommendations include taking care that conservation covenants associated 
with offsets do not ‘sterilise’24 large areas of land and thereby prevent future beneficial developments 
(such as wind farms) (RUK #3,10), that BDO requirements should not be backdated as this ‘would 
have a negative impact on the financial viability of projects which are already in the system’ (RUK 
#13), and that there should be no central recording of offsets (CLBA #31). The latter view is 
contradicted directly by arguments in several other submissions favouring the creation of a central 
accreditation database managed by government (for example by Natural England), without a parallel 
corporate system, particularly to avoid double-counting and double-selling of offset credits (RSPB 
#79)25.  
 
The desire to reduce planning friction is also present in some representations regarding provisions for 
habitat banking to provide future income streams to landowners. The CLBA (#38-40), for example, 
favour a situation whereby landowners might sell habitat ex post as an offset, i.e. that ex ante 
demonstration of intent to create an offset is not necessary. They also support the use of offset 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Thus at the First World Forum on Natural Capital held in Edinburgh 21-22 November 2013, the Biodiversity 
Director for the major French public financing organisation CDC (Group Caisse des Dépôts) described how 
CDC is receiving lucrative returns from the sale of BDO credits from a conservation bank it has invested in, 
while also requiring that its own conventional development offset their biodiversity impacts – including through 
the purchase of offsets provided by the same investment company (Sullivan pers. obs. and field notes). As such, 
profit is generated simultaneously from economic activity causing environmental harm, and from the 
conservation compensations required by the same company to apparently offset this harm.  
24 The paradoxical use of the word ‘sterilise’ here is perhaps indicative of a broader value framing. Although 
such ‘sterilised’ lands would be those managed to support living biodiversity and ecosystems, the term is used to 
denote land that is thereby denied the potential of the economic ‘fecundity’ brought by development.  
25 On which point it is interesting to observe that the No Net Loss conference held by BBOP in London in June 
2014 was structured precisely into separate parallel sessions for government and corporate strategies on 
offsetting (see agenda at http://bbop.forest-trends.org/events/no-net-loss/documents/agenda.pdf).  
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designations to sustain environmental gain that might otherwise be lost, or in cases where biodiversity 
gain arises through other land management agendas. For others these would contravene additionality 
requirements, because there is no way of knowing these ‘improvements’ would not have existed 
without the offset. 
 
Contrary to such friction-free models of a ‘free market’ in BDO, other submissions assert the need for 
a strict and strong regulatory framework, with clear national guidelines and a system of national 
offsets accreditation and registration, accompanied by robust ecological databases and regular 
independent monitoring and review (see Table 3). Such recommendations are accompanied by pleas 
for increased government support and resourcing for local government, especially in relation to 
ecological expertise, assessment and capacity, and enforcement.  
 
6) The evidence-base for BDO is 
(i) strong 
 or 
(ii) weak. 
Views regarding the evidence-base for BDO are diametrically opposed. The Environment Bank state 
that ‘the case for biodiversity offsetting is well-evidenced through international and national 
experience’ (EB #29,39). Other respondents argue that there are ‘few empirical studies of the 
effectiveness of biodiversity offsets’, and that those that exist demonstrate lower species richness on 
offset sites than on the sites they are offsetting (FoE #42,58). For the RSPB (#34), the evidence 
globally suggests ‘that there are no systems in the world that have been able to demonstrate no net loss 
of biodiversity, [with] the wealth of studies showing (often considerable) net losses’. 
 
A number of pragmatic recommendations regarding the design of BDO are notable in the texts, even 
in those that tend towards strong disagreement with BDO. Values expressed regarding key design 
elements are considered below. 
 
7) BDO should be 
(i) mandatory 
 or 
(ii) voluntary and fully permissive. 
A key issue is whether or not BDO should be mandatory or voluntary for developers. Developers and 
related trade associations would prefer a voluntary and fully permissive approach (CLBA #4,19; HBF 
#8; RUK #1,6), so as not to increase the regulatory burden to developers and thus ‘stifle future 
development projects’ (LT #9), or to limit possibilities for choosing the most efficient compensatory 
mechanism (HBF #10). Thus for the Home Builders Federation it is flexibility in the choice of 
compensatory mechanism that will set ‘the right market signals in place’ (HBF #11). As noted above, 
the desire here is ultimately to create a ‘free market’ in offset trading through making the system as 
simple and as friction-free as possible.  
 
There is also a common view that BDO is likely to inspire investor and purchaser confidence only if it 
is mandatory (eg CLBA #19). This is a view that conservation charities and environmental 
organisations, whilst frequently resistant to BDO on principle, tend to endorse, arguing that if the 
policy is established then it will need to be mandatory in order to offer any conservation effectiveness 
(see Table 4). The Environment Bank is also vehement that BDO will only be effective if mandatory, 
asserting that ‘the Green Paper could have set out this case [for mandatory offsetting] more strongly 
and that, as a result of the failure to do so, much of the arguments against offsetting will be poorly 
based’ (EB #74). Related to this is an aspirational orientation that sees BDO working best as a market 
of willing sellers and buyers with growing demand secured by making offset requirements mandatory 
in planning requirements. Thus, ‘[v]ery few developers will ever choose to compensate where they are 
not required to do so. Lack of demand then fails to drive offset supply, the market stays small and 
expensive, and the system does not work’ (EB #45). It is difficult, however, to separate this 
recommendation from the Environment Bank’s own interests as a private sector broker of offset deals 
that will gain from such mandatory status.  
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8) Offset designations should 
(i) remain valid in perpetuity to safeguard conservation outcomes 
 or 
ii. not remain valid in perpetuity as this would entail wrongful ‘sterilisation’ of land-use possibilities. 
The length of time for which an offset designation should apply is the cause of strong oppositional 
framings in the transcripts. The Country Land and Business Association, representing the interests of 
large landowners, frames the ‘in perpetuity’ requirements of proposed conservation covenants as 
‘fundamentally wrong’, saying that ‘we suspect that many landowners will see little that is attractive 
about dedicating land in perpetuity. They might as well sell it’ (CLBA #32; also NFU #5,6,8). Lafarge 
Tarmac assert similarly that:  
asking landowners to commit to undertaking / being responsible for a management regime in 
perpetuity, when it is nearly impossible to calculate accurately what the costs will be of that 
regime in 10 years let alone 50, 80 or 99, is likely to cause them some concern and hesitancy 
towards the prospects being offered. Furthermore, such a commitment being made as a charge 
against the provider’s property could also affect the future value of that property thus adding 
another concern / reason for landowners not to progress as offset providers (LT #22).  
 
Conversely, submissions talk of the need for any offset designations to be protected in perpetuity. 
Thus, ‘[i]f offsetting is to be meaningful and command public confidence, any replacement sites 
would need to be safeguarded in perpetuity. This raises extremely difficult questions, for example of 
mapping, monitoring, legal enforcement, resilience, and long-term management through changes of 
ownership’ (NWDA #8; also TWT #85). 	  
 
9) Offsets should be located 
(i) close to sites of development-related harm 
 or 
(ii) strategically chosen at any distance to improve connectivity of valued ecosystems in keeping with 
spatial plans.  
IEMA (#8,31) state that views on the location of offsets projects relative to impact sites pull both 
ways, ‘with strong arguments for both local [i.e. distance-near] and strategic [i.e. increased 
connectivity and landscape level] approaches’. For a number of conservation charities, submissions 
emphasise design principles based on local ecological concerns. These include that offsets should be 
distance-near, rather than located far from development sites, based on an assumption that close 
distance will equate to ecological similarity between offset and development sites (e.g. BL #24), and 
that this will support local interactions between people and wildlife. The Woodland Trust recommends 
that ‘[a]ny metric should use localness as one of the key factors when determining offset scale, i.e. 
increased distance from original damage should incur a penalty’ so as to support ‘the Government’s 
policy of maintaining the interaction of people with nature’ (WT #15-16; also FSC #3).  
 
From the perspective of generating market liquidity in commoditised offset products, however, others 
urge that as much flexibility as possible should be permitted for offset location, such that offsets may 
‘be located outside the immediate area of the planning application’ (NBF #15). Some submissions thus 
advocate the use of BDO calculations to move developments to ‘low-value’ habitats (e.g. PE #12), 
thereby ‘trading up’ to ensure net gain (NT #21) rather than supporting only like-for-like local 
exchanges. Others express concern that this strategy will be used to devalue green space sites with 
high local use-values and which support species that ‘fall through the net’ of BDO metrics (e.g BL 
#5,20). Additional concerns are that a ‘race-to-the-cheapest’ in terms of pricing will mean that good 
quality agricultural land may become available for development in part through scoring poorly on 
habitat metrics (FoE #76).  
 
3.3 From loss to gain via ‘No Net Loss’?  
By now it should be clear that, whilst ‘no net loss’ (NNL) is widely supported as a minimum 
objective, there is no broad agreement that a BDO policy can in fact achieve this aim. The claim that 
no net loss overall, or even a ‘net gain’ can be produced from a policy structured to require losses of 
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populations and habitats is framed by critics as paradoxical at best (RSPB #32), guaranteeing only 
‘ecological loss for uncertain gains’ (RSPB #32). Those most resistant to the idea that BDO can 
generate NNL frame this as an irrational and ‘wantonly specious’ claim (BNEF #5,43). Other 
submitters question NNL itself as the most appropriate objective towards which to be designing 
policy, noting instead that given the scale of contemporary biodiversity crisis the aim should be firmly 
stated as a ‘net gain’ of biodiversity (AG #20; TWT #9; PE #17). The Wildlife Trusts note that it is 
unclear from the DEFRA Green Paper what geographical scale the objective of ‘no let loss’ should 
apply to (TWT #40), while NERC (#5), amongst others, note that what elements of biodiversity are 
able to be caught by the metric will depend on how fine-scale its application is with regard to the 
detail included in habitat assessments. As we discuss further below, such comments illuminate 
underlying concerns regarding not only how wide the ‘net’ of the metric should be cast, or how coarse 
or fine its mesh should be, but also over whether or not the frame of ‘netting nature’ is indeed the most 
appropriate for a revaluing of ‘nature’ that redresses losses due to human activity. 
 
 
4. Discussion   
As the above analysis indicates, a wide spectrum of views are expressed in the EAC submissions, 
from enthusiastic support for a BDO policy in England, to vigorous contestation and concern. The 
submissions encompass a range of almost diametrically opposed positions. Some see BDO as the way 
of the future, as a revolutionary and innovative means of pragmatically providing multiple-win 
solutions to both environmental and economic issues, and frame competing perceptions and concerns 
as reactionary and inconvenient. Thus, ‘[b]iodiversity offsetting is a new opportunity to make a 
difference to environmental conservation, and as such should not be designed with old fashioned and 
restrictive mindsets’ (Environment Bank, point 22). Others are ‘sceptical about the motivation behind 
the Green Paper proposals’, and state that the proposals contained therein ‘would need to be improved 
beyond recognition’ (NWDA #1,4).  
 
The debates highlight different ways of understanding both the value of nature, and the nature of 
value. Those seeing themselves as working pragmatically within the value framework of the market 
economy perceive the application of monetary values, which require numerical scoring systems, to be 
the most efficient means of achieving a logically beneficial re-allocation of value which shifts ‘nature’ 
out of its current state of value invisibility. Others contest the appropriateness both of monetary 
valuation and of markets, arguing that these cannot adequately reflect intrinsic values conferred by 
uniqueness, or the consequent unsubstitutability of species populations and habitats located in places. 
These diametrically opposed frames and positions are suggestive of a dispute that cannot be resolved 
satisfactorily for all parties through deliberative processes, since they are indicative of different 
underlying understandings and practices of ‘value’. We thus find the notion of ‘value struggle’ (cf. de 
Angelis 2007) to be powerful in understanding the impasse that is arising between these positions, 
since this emphasises the significance of the ideological values and associated rationalities (and even 
ontologies) underlying the frames through which those engaging in this struggle articulate their views 
(cf. Lakoff 2010; Descola 2013). 
 
4.1 Value struggles 
Broadly speaking, those in favour of BDO and other proposed MBIs as multiple-win solutions for 
resolving development-related environmental harms consider that BDO, through encouraging the 
creation of new habitat to offset calculated losses to individuals and populations at specific sites, will 
effect the net conservation of species, rather of specific populations (of species) in specific places. 
Through their embrace of marketised exchanges as the appropriate arena for distributing losses and 
gains of biodiversity, they also pragmatically and politically accept a ‘law of value’ (see discussion in 
de Angelis 2007) that enshrines capitalist market mechanisms as the most efficient means of allocating 
and managing what thereby becomes valued. In this value frame, ‘nature’ arguably becomes simply 
another arena for the abstraction, calculation and capture of capital ‘value’, and it is only in this way 
that nature can be ‘valued’ and thus appropriately managed.  
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Following de Angelis (2007: 13), however, ‘capital’ is a ‘social force that aspires to colonise life with 
its particular mode of doing and articulating social powers’ (see also Foucault (2008[1979])). This 
means that the depoliticised or seemingly non-ideological (cf. Žižek 2011: 426) and technical 
calculative ‘market rationality’ supporting capital accumulation requires understanding as ‘a value 
practice among many others and in conflict with others’ (de Angelis 2007: 24; also Graeber 2001). 
This is not to suggest that any of the texts analysed here explicitly share de Angelis’s perspective. 
Nonetheless a fundamental disagreement about the desirability of subsuming ‘nature’ within ‘capital’ 
is discernible within the submissions, and it is this cleavage that gives rise to the intractable value 
opposition between the claim that unmeasured and unpriced nature has zero or no value in a market 
economy – and thus should be both measured and priced – and the contrary position that nature is 
valuable precisely because it is, or should be, unpriceable, i.e. ‘priceless’ (O’Neill 1993, Reid 2013; 
Knights et al. 2013). 
 
In broader debates, some of those opposing MBIs see these as underpinned by the ontological 
assumption of humans as self-interested, disembedded utility-maximising individuals, caught within a 
universalising but culturally and historically specific calculative rationality (Weber 2010(1930)) that 
privileges numerical value striations and rewards those skilled in associated quantification practices 
and mathematical modelling (see, for example, Sullivan 2009; Dempsey and Robertson 2012; 
Turnhout et al. 2013; Descola 2013). BDO is seen here as an inappropriate application of metrological 
and accounting frames and skills to phenomena whose value cannot be thereby conveyed. Monetised 
market values arising from such applications are viewed as spurious, albeit beneficial to those able to 
capture and thus gain from such values. MBIs are framed as problematic due to their advancement of a 
‘technogarden’ scenario of environmental management (as framed in the Millenium Ecosystem 
Assessment, see discussion in Kareiva et al 2011) that furthers the modern disconnect between a 
rationally calculative culture and a pacified, objectified ‘net-able’ nature, a divide seen as the root of 
so many post-modern environmental and social ills, including biodiversity loss (cf. Çalişkan and 
Callon, 2010: 5-8; Descola 2013).  
 
Of further concern is the assumption of market economics that competition is necessarily at the core of 
social relations. De Angelis (2007) observes that this pits livelihoods, and now also nonhuman natures 
and place-based assemblages, against one another so as to generate a race to the bottom to extract 
more commodity value for less labour from both humans and ‘nature’. By entraining nature 
conservation further within capital’s ‘law of value’, BDO could, as the Friends of the Earth (#16) 
submission notes, ‘simply facilitate greater destruction of nature in areas of high development pressure 
in return for a promise of habitat creation where land is cheaper’, as well as reducing incentives for 
developers to incorporate spaces for nature on-site when they can instead pay for biodiversity in 
another (cheaper) location. The salt in the wound for those contesting BDO from such perspectives is 
that this emergent policy seems likely to further enrich the corporate extractive and development 
interests whose economically productive activities are arguably at the heart of the ‘environmental 
debt’ BDO purports to address (cf. Motesharrei et al. 2014, Ostry et al. 2014). Development-related 
harm thus both boosts the value of and demand for conservation, through enhancing biodiversity 
scarcity (cf. discussion in Sullivan 2012), and becomes the solution to biodiversity loss, since it is 
development that both finances, and in many cases provides, offsets (as noted by Lafarge Tarmac – 
see 3.2 above). Invocations of the triple bottom-line notwithstanding, it is seen as not at all clear that 
‘people’ or ‘planet’ would take precedence if ‘profits’ were reduced through their care.  
 
As noted above, opponents of BDO also repeatedly assert and affirm the non-substitutable character of 
‘nature’. Place-based affective values, and direct relationships with the actual individuals, populations, 
and assemblages making up ‘nature’, are seen to be denied by calculative (capitalist) value frames. 
Through the metrics and markets of offsetting, these are seen as emphasising abstraction, 
substitutability, exchangeability and fungibility between different species, places and temporal 
moments, so as to generate the calculated appearance of ‘no net loss’. But what is really ‘netted’ 
through these calculations? And what is thereby lost or gained through their application? 
 
4.2 The nature of nets 
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The word net, as in ‘no net loss’, although intended as a neutral economic term meaning ‘balanced, 
final, conclusive; remaining after all necessary considerations have been taken into account’ (OED), is 
itself not without evaluative content. It comes from Middle French net, meaning clean or morally pure, 
which in turn derives from classical Latin nitidus, meaning bright, shining or glossy (from nitēre to 
shine). This etymology is shared with the English word neat, which connects notions of tidiness with 
notions of unadulterated purity, and tends to carry clear positive associations. The etymology of net as 
in ‘fishing net’ is less clear, but it seems to derive via Norse and Germanic variants from an Indo-
European base meaning ‘to bind, twist together’ (OED).  
 
If the etymological roots really are so different, then it seems an interesting coincidence that what 
might be called economic ‘netting’, the process of summing losses and gains to arrive at a final (neat) 
figure, seems here to overlap so closely with mechanical ‘netting’, as in capturing something desirable 
in a mesh, filtering away extraneous material or liquid. The mesh-like matrix of an offsetting metric 
seems to connect the two senses. When opponents of BDO speak of their concerns about species 
‘falling through the net’, they invoke a metaphor of this mesh being too coarse. The holes are too big, 
allowing things (species, populations, individuals) that should have been caught (or valued) to slip 
through unnoticed and be lost. These losses lead to errors in the summing up or ‘netting’ process, and 
hence can only lead to a ‘net loss’. To invoke Boltanski and Thévenot (2006: 36) once more, BDO 
breaks down in the transition from the general to the particular, where the ‘clamour of particular 
details’ sublimated, and in this case extinguished, by other orders of worth, demands to be heard. 
 
Sophisticated ecological arguments are also in play here, pointing to the inability of simple metrics to 
accurately represent unpredictable, nonlinear, stochastic living systems. From this perspective, it is not 
only impossible but meaningless to talk of adding and subtracting discrete pieces of nature to produce 
an overall net total. The calculative frame of ‘nature’ as ‘net-able’ through numerical assessment and 
accounting is thus also at odds with a frame that values ‘nature’ as complex, emergent and 
autopoetically dependent on ‘networked’ meshes between places and populations (cf. Jantsch, 1979; 
Margulis, 1998). Those countering BDO proposals frequently do so from a visceral sense that it is 
irrational to conceive that a ‘net gain’ of biodiversity can be generated through further breaking of 
these connections, as may be legitimised through BDO. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Analysis of discourses present in the series of texts the UK Parliament’s Environmental Audit 
Committee’s public consultation regarding emerging BDO policy reveals some agreement, but many 
points of fundamental disagreement between actors making submissions to the EAC Inquiry. 
Consideration of recurrent discursive patterns suggests that polarised disagreements indicate the 
presence of significantly divergent underlying value frames acting to shape respondents’ views on the 
desirability, rationality and effectiveness of BDO, and of market-based conservation instruments more 
generally. This suggests poor prospects for the resolution of such disagreements through deliberative 
negotiation and consultation focussed on the refinement of specific proposed biodiversity offsetting 
policies, since the key issues at stake are ethical, political and ideological, rather than technical. They 
involve questions about the desirability of further subsuming ‘nature’ within ‘capital’ value frames, 
and addressing such issues requires reflection and deliberation on how those concerned understand 
both the value of nature, and the nature of value.  
 
Following Lakoff (2010), it seems clear that those seeking to oppose BDO will be assisted by focusing 
clearly on communicating their underlying values on such matters. Notwithstanding the need to 
respond to government consultations when these arise, there are limits to what can be achieved by 
arguing within terms of reference set by enthusiasts for market-based approaches to biodiversity 
conservation. Conversely, assuming a sincere desire on the part of government to build support for 
BDO among conservation professionals and the broader public, our findings here suggest that this 
might be better achieved by opening and facilitating a deeper discussion about the merits or otherwise 
of market valuation approaches, rather than by taking the value of MBIs as given and consulting only 
on technical issues of implementation. 
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